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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm that
possesses smooth ambiguity preferences and faces ambiguous price and background risk. The sepa-
ration theorem holds in that the firm’s optimal output level depends neither on the firm’s attitude
towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the underlying ambiguity. We derive necessary and suffi-
cient conditions under which the full-hedging theorem holds and thus options are not used. When
these conditions are violated, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if
ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean-preserving-spreads. We
as such show that options play a role as a hedging instrument over and above that of futures.
Keywords: futures, options, production, smooth ambiguity preferences
JEL classification numbers: D21, D81, G13
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work of Sandmo (1971), the theory of the competitive firm under price
uncertainty has been extensively studied. One important strand of this literature is on
the behavior of the firm when a futures market exists (Danthine, 1978; Feder et al., 1980;
Holthausen, 1979), from which two notable results emanate. First, the separation theorem
states that the firm’s production decision depends neither on the firm’s preferences nor
on the underlying price distribution. Second, the full-hedging theorem asserts that the
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firm should completely eliminate its exposure to the price risk by adopting a full-hedge if
the futures market is unbiased.1 A corollary of the full-hedging theorem is that no other
hedging instruments, options in particular, play a role that is over and above that of futures
for hedging purposes (Battermann et al., 2000).2
The literature on additive background risk stems from the seminal work of Kihlstrom
et al. (1981), Nachman (1982), and Ross (1981).3 Gollier and Pratt (1996) characterize
necessary and sufficient conditions under which the introduction of additive background
risk leads to more cautious behavior, which they refer to as “risk vulnerability.” Franke et
al. (2006, 2011) extend the results of Gollier and Pratt (1996) to characterize conditions on
preferences that lead to more cautious behavior with additive and multiplicative background
risk. Wong (2014) shows that the separation and full-hedging theorems are robust to the
introduction of additive background risk.
In this paper, we adopt the premise that the competitive firm of Sandmo (1971) is
unable to unambiguously assign probability distributions that uniquely describe the price
and background risk. In other words, the firm faces ambiguity, or uncertainty in the sense
of Knight (1921), about the price and background risk.4 Ambiguity averse preferences are
supported by convincing evidence from many experiments (Chow and Sarin, 2001; Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and Weber, 1993) and surveys (Chesson and Viscusi, 2003; Viscusi
and Chesson, 1999), which document that individuals prefer gambles with known rather
than unknown probabilities.5
1The full-hedging theorem is analogous to a well-known result in the insurance literature that a risk-averse
individual fully insures at an actuarially fair price (Mossin, 1968).
2Lapan et al. (1991) show that options are used by the competitive firm only when the futures price
and/or option premiums are perceived by the firm as biased. Options as such appear to be a speculative
device rather than a hedging instrument.
3Examples of additive background risk abound. Some of the initial wealth of the competitive firm may
be held in risky assets and thus creates an additional source of uncertainty (Chavas, 1985). The fixed cost
of the competitive firm may also be random because the firm’s physical assets can be ruined by natural
disasters or fire (Wong, 1996, 2014).
4Knight (1921) points out that ambiguity is fundamentally different from risk. Specifically, risk relates
to objective uncertainty, where outcome probabilities are known or can be estimated with confidence. In
contrast, ambiguity relates to subjective uncertainty, where outcome probabilities are unknown, and decision
makers are not sure which estimated models are correct.
5Dated back to the Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, ambiguity has been alluded to the violation of the inde-
pendence axiom, which is responsible for the decision criterion being linear in the outcome probabilities. See
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Klibanoff et al. (2005) have recently developed a powerful decision criterion known as
“smooth ambiguity aversion” that is compatible with ambiguity averse preferences under
uncertainty (hereafter referred to as the KMM model). The KMMmodel features the recur-
sive structure that is far more tractable in comparison to other models of ambiguity such as
the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-prior) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989).6 Another nice feature of the KMM model is that the conventional techniques in
the decision making under uncertainty are applicable in the context of ambiguity (Alary et
al., 2013; Broll and Wong, 2015; Cherbonnier and Gollier, 2015; Gollier, 2011; Iwaki and
Osaki, 2014; Snow, 2010, 2011; Taboga, 2005; Treich, 2010; Wong, 2015a, 2016a).
The KMM model represents ambiguity by a second-order probability distribution that
captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the price and
background risk. The KMM model then measures the firm’s expected utility under ambi-
guity by taking the second-order expectation of a concave transformation of the first-order
expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective joint distribution of the
price and background risk.7 While it is reasonable to assume that the firm regards the price
and background risk to be independent of each other for given subjective beliefs, they are
deemed to be second-order dependent when the subjective beliefs vary. This second-order
dependence structure of the ambiguous price and background risk is crucial in determining
the firm’s production and hedging decisions.
Within the KMM model, we show that the separation theorem holds in that the firm’s
optimal output level depends neither on the firm’s attitude towards ambiguity nor on the
incident to the underlying ambiguity. This is because the firm can always sell the last unit
of its output through the futures contracts. The marginal revenue as such is locked in at
the predetermined futures price, which is equated to the marginal cost of production at
the optimum. Hence, we extend the separation theorem to the case of smooth ambiguity
Dillenberger and Segal (2015) and Machina (2014).
6See Lien (2000) and Lien and Wang (2003) who adopt the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) to examine the competitive firm’s production and hedging decisions.
7Skiadas (2013) shows that smooth ambiguity preferences can be approximated by preferences admitting
an expected utility representation in continuous-time or high-frequency models under Brownian or Poisson
uncertainty.
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preferences and in the presence of ambiguous price and background risk.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full-hedging theorem
holds. These conditions are rather strong. For example, they hold if the firm is risk neutral
and the background risk has a constant conditional mean. In this case, the risk-neutral firm
simply regards the background risk with a constant conditional mean as unambiguous. This
is consistent with the findings of Wong (2015a) that the full-hedging theorem applies under
smooth ambiguity preferences should the background risk be absent. When the necessary
and sufficient conditions do not hold, options may play a role as a hedging instrument.
Indeed, if ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean-
preserving-spreads, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes
irrespective of whether the firm is ambiguity neutral or ambiguity averse. Since the full-
hedging theorem holds when ambiguity is absent (Wong, 2014), the behavior of the firm
is affected by the introduction of ambiguity even under ambiguity neutrality. This novel
finding is driven by the second-order dependence structure between the ambiguous price
and background risk, which is absent in the extant literature that focuses on a single source
of ambiguity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section delineates the KMM
model of the competitive firm facing ambiguous price and background risk. Section III
characterizes the firm’s optimal production decision. Section IV derives the firm’s optimal
hedging decision. The final section concludes.
II. THE MODEL
We incorporate the KMM model into the competitive firm of Sandmo (1971). There is
one period with two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0, the firm produces a single commodity
according to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level and C(Q)
is compounded to date 1. The firm’s production technology exhibits decreasing returns to
scale so that the cost function, C(Q), satisfies that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0 and
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C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.
At date 1, the firm sells its entire output, Q, at the then prevailing per-unit price, P˜ ,
which is a positive random variable not known ex ante.8 The price risk, P˜ , is distributed
according to an objective cumulative distribution function (CDF), F ◦(P ), over support
[P, P ], where 0 < P < P . Besides the price risk, P˜ , the firm faces other sources of risk that
are aggregated into a single random variable, Z˜, which is referred to as the background risk.
We assume that Z˜ is independent of P˜ , and is additive in nature. The background risk, Z˜,
is distributed according to an objective CDF, G◦(Z), over support [Z, Z], where Z < Z .9
We denote EF◦(·) and EG◦(·) as the expectation operators with respect to the objective
CDFs, F ◦(P ) and G◦(Z), respectively.
While the background risk, Z˜, is neither hedgeable nor insurable, the firm can hedge
against the price risk, P˜ , by trading infinitely divisible futures and put option contracts at
date 0, each of which calls for delivery of one unit of the commodity at date 1.10 The futures
price is predetermined at P f at date 0, where P < P f < P . The put option contracts have
a single strike price, K, and an exogenously given option premium, Φ, per contract, where
P < K < P and Φ > 0. The option premium, Φ, is compounded to date 1.
The firm’s random profit at date 1 is given by
Π(P˜ , Z˜) = P˜Q− C(Q) + (P f − P˜ )X + [max(K − P˜ , 0)− Φ]Y + Z˜, (1)
where X is the number of the futures contracts sold (purchased if negative), and Y is the
number of the put option contracts purchased (sold if negative) by the firm at date 0. We
say that the firm’s futures position, X , is an under-hedge, a full-hedge, or an over-hedge,
depending on whether X is smaller than, equal to, or greater than the output level, Q,
respectively. The firm’s put option position, Y , is a long (short) position if Y > (<) 0. The
firm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u(Π), defined over its profit at
8Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
9We allow the background risk, Z˜, to have either a positive, zero, or negative mean.
10Because of the put-call parity, payoffs of any combinations of futures, calls, and puts can be replicated
by any two of these three financial instruments, thereby rendering one of them to be redundant. As such,
restricting the firm to use only futures and put option contracts is without any loss of generality.
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date 1, Π, with u′(Π) > 0 and u′′(Π) ≤ 0. The firm is risk neutral or risk averse, depending
on whether u(Π) = Π or u′′(Π) < 0, respectively.
The firm faces ambiguity in that it is uncertain about the objective CDFs, F ◦(P ) and
G◦(Z). Let F (P |θ) and G(Z|θ) be the firm’s first-order subjective CDFs of P˜ and Z˜,
respectively, where θ is the realization of an unknown parameter, θ˜. The KMM model
represents ambiguity by a second-order subjective CDF of θ˜, H(θ), over support [θ, θ] with
θ < θ, which captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the first-order CDFs govern P˜
and Z˜. Following Gollier (2011), Snow (2010, 2011), and Wong (2015b, 2016b), we assume
that the firm’s ambiguous beliefs are unbiased in the following sense:
∫ θ
θ
F (P |θ)dH(θ) = F ◦(P ), (2)
for all P ∈ [P, P ], and
∫ θ
θ
G(Z|θ)dH(θ) = G◦(Z), (3)
for all Z ∈ [Z, Z]. We denote EF (·|θ), EG(·|θ), and EH(·) as the expectation operators with
respect to the subjective CDFs, F (P |θ), G(Z|θ), and H(θ), respectively.
While the price risk, P˜ , and the background risk, Z˜, are first-order independent given
a fixed value of the parameter, θ, they become second-order dependent as θ varies. To see
this, we calculate the covariance between A(P˜ ) and B(Z˜):
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
{A(P )− EF◦ [A(P˜ )]}{B(Z)− EG◦ [B(Z˜)]}dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ)dH(θ)
=
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
{A(P )− EF [A(P˜ )|θ]}{B(Z)− EG[B(Z˜)|θ]}dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ)dH(θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
{EF [A(P˜)|θ]− EF◦ [A(P˜ )]}{EG[B(Z˜)|θ]− EG◦ [B(Z˜)]}dH(θ)
= CovH{EF [A(P˜ )|θ˜],EG[B(Z˜)|θ˜]}, (4)
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where A(·) and B(·) are two arbitrarily chosen functions, CovH(·, ·) is the covariance oper-
ator with respect to the second-order CDF, H(θ), and we have used Eqs. (2) and (3). It
follows from Eq. (4) that A(P˜ ) and B(Z˜) are second-order positively (negatively) depen-
dent if CovH{EF [A(P˜)|θ˜],EG[B(Z˜)|θ˜]} > (<) 0. For example, this is the case when changes
in θ affect the first-order expected values of A(P˜ ) and B(Z˜), EF [A(P˜ )|θ] and EG[B(Z˜)|θ],
in the same direction (opposite directions) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. We can justify the second-order
dependence structure between P˜ and Z˜ by a learning framework, whereby the first-order
priors are the Bayesian posterior distributions, and the second-order priors are the uncon-
ditional likelihoods. In this context, we can interpret θ as a latent business cycle indicator
that affects the price and background risk simultaneously.
The recursive structure of the KMM model implies that we can compute the firm’s
expected utility under ambiguity in three steps. First, we calculate the firm’s expected
utility for each first-order joint CDF of P˜ and Z˜:
U(θ) =
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
u[Π(P, Z)]dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ), (5)
where Π(P, Z) is given by Eq. (1). Second, we transform each first-order expected utility
obtained in Eq. (5) by an ambiguity function, ϕ(U), where ϕ′(U) > 0 and U is the firm’s
utility level. Finally, we take the expectation of the transformed first-order expected utility
obtained in the second step with respect to the second-order CDF of θ˜. The firm’s ex-ante
decision problem as such is given by
max
Q≥0,X,Y
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(θ)]dH(θ), (6)
where U(θ) is defined by Eq. (5). Inspection of the objective function of program (6) reveals
that the effect of ambiguity, represented by the second-order CDF, H(θ), and the effect of
ambiguity preferences, represented by the shape of the ambiguity function, ϕ(U), can be
separated and thus studied independently.
We say that the firm is ambiguity averse if, for any given triple of output level and
hedge position, (Q,X, Y ), the objective function of program (6) decreases when the firm’s
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ambiguous beliefs, specified byH(θ), change in a way that induces a mean-preserving-spread
in the distribution of the firm’s first-order expected utility. According to this definition,
Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that ambiguity aversion implies that the ambiguity function,
ϕ(U), is concave in U .11 The firm is ambiguity neutral or ambiguity averse, depending on
whether ϕ(U) = U or ϕ′′(U) < 0, respectively.
The first-order conditions for program (6) are given by
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
ϕ′[U∗(θ)]u′[Π∗(P, Z)][P −C′(Q∗)]dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ)dH(θ) = 0, (7)
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
ϕ′[U∗(θ)]u′[Π∗(P, Z)](P f − P )dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ)dH(θ) = 0, (8)
and
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
ϕ′[U∗(θ)]u′[Π∗(P, Z)][max(K − P, 0)−Φ]dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ)dH(θ) = 0, (9)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order conditions for program
(6) are satisfied given the assumed properties of ϕ(U), u(Π), and C(Q).
III. OPTIMAL PRODUCTION DECISION
Adding Eqs. (7) and (8) yields
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
ϕ′[U∗(θ)]u′[Π∗(P, Z)][P f − C′(Q∗)]dF (P |θ)dG(Z|θ)dH(θ) = 0, (10)
It follows from ϕ′(U) > 0 and u′(Π) > 0 that Eq. (10) reduces to C′(Q∗) = P f , thereby
invoking our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Given that the ambiguity-averse competitive firm can hedge against the
ambiguous price risk, P˜ , by trading the futures and put option contracts, the firm’s optimal
11When ϕ(U) = −η−1 exp(−ηU), Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the maxmin expected utility model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is the limiting case as the coefficient of absolute ambiguity aversion, η,
approaches infinity under some conditions.
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output level, Q∗, is the one that equates the marginal cost of production, C′(Q∗), to the
predetermined futures price, P f .
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Since the firm can always sell the last
unit of its output through the futures contracts at the predetermined futures price, P f , the
usual optimality condition applies in that the marginal cost of production, C′(Q∗), must
be equated to the known marginal revenue, P f , which determines the optimal output level,
Q∗. This result holds irrespective of whether the put option contracts are available to the
firm for hedging purposes or not.
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that the firm’s optimal production decision
depends neither on the firm’s attitude towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the under-
lying ambiguity. Proposition 1 as such extends the separation theorem of Danthine (1978),
Feder et al. (1980), and Holthausen (1979) to the case of smooth ambiguity preferences and
in the presence of ambiguous price and background risk.12
IV. OPTIMAL HEDGING DECISION
To focus on the firm’s pure hedging motive, we assume henceforth that the futures and put
option contracts are fairly priced in that
P f = EF◦(P˜ ) =
∫ θ
θ
EF (P˜ |θ)dH(θ), (11)
and
Φ = EF◦ [max(K − P˜ , 0)] =
∫ θ
θ
EF [max(K − P˜ , 0)|θ]dH(θ). (12)
Eqs. (11) and (12) imply that P f and Φ are set equal to the unconditional expected values
of P˜ and max(K − P˜ , 0) with respect to both the objective and subjective CDFs of P˜ ,
respectively.
12Wong (2016) shows that the separation theorem fails to hold should the ambiguous background risk be
multiplicative in nature.
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Differentiating the objective function of program (6) with respect to X , and evaluating
the resulting derivative at Q = Q∗, X = Q∗, and Y = 0 yields
∂
∂X
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(θ)]dH(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=Q∗,Y=0
=
∫ θ
θ
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ]}EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ][EF◦(P˜ )− EF (P˜ |θ)]dH(θ)
= −CovH
{
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ˜]}EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ˜],EF (P˜ |θ˜)
}
, (13)
where Π∗ = EF◦(P˜ )Q
∗ − C(Q∗), and the second equality follows from Eq. (2) and the
property of the covariance operator, CovH(·, ·).
13 Likewise, we differentiate the objective
function of program (6) with respect to Y , and evaluate the resulting derivative at Q = Q∗,
X = Q∗, and Y = 0 to yield
∂
∂Y
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(θ)]dH(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=Q∗,Y=0
= CovH
{
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ˜]}EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ˜],EF [max(K − P˜ , 0)|θ˜]
}
. (14)
Using Eqs. (13) and (14), the full-hedging theorem holds, i.e., X∗ = Q∗ and Y ∗ = 0, if,
and only if, the following two conditions hold simultaneously:
CovH
{
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ˜]}EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ˜],EF (P˜ |θ˜)
}
= 0, (15)
and
CovH
{
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ˜]}EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ˜],EF [max(K − P˜ , 0)|θ˜]
}
= 0, (16)
where Π∗ = EF◦(P˜ )Q
∗−C(Q∗). The term, ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗+ Z˜)|θ]}u′(Π∗+ Z˜), is the marginal
ambiguity under a full-hedge and zero-option position. Using Eq. (4), conditions (15)
and (16) simply say that this marginal ambiguity is neither second-order dependent on the
13For any two random variables, X˜ and Y˜ , we have CovH(X˜, Y˜ ) = EH(X˜Y˜ )− EH(X˜)EH(Y˜ ).
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payoff of the futures contracts, P˜ −P f , nor second-order dependent on the payoff of the put
option contracts, max(K − P˜ , 0), respectively. Given that covariances can be interpreted
as marginal variances, conditions (15) and (16) ensure that the firm has already minimized
the variability of its utility under ambiguity by adopting the full-hedge and zero-option
position. We as such establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given that the ambiguity-averse competitive firm can hedge against the am-
biguous price risk, P˜ , by trading the fairly priced futures and put option contracts, the firm
optimally opts for a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = Q∗, and uses no options, i.e., Y ∗ = 0, if, and
only if, the marginal ambiguity, ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ]}u′(Π∗ + Z˜), is neither second-order
dependent on the payoff of the futures contracts, P˜ − P f , nor second-order dependent on
the payoff of the put option contracts, max(K − P˜ , 0).
In the absence of the ambiguous background risk, Eqs. (15) and (16) hold trivially,
which is consistent with the finding of Wong (2015a) that the full-hedging theorem applies
when the price risk is the only source of ambiguity. In the presence of the background risk,
however, Eqs. (15) and (16) may or may not hold simultaneously. To see this, we consider
the case that the firm is risk neutral, i.e., u(Π) = Π. In this case, Eqs. (15) and (16) reduce
to
CovH{ϕ
′[Π∗ +EG(Z˜|θ˜)],EF (P˜ |θ˜)} = 0, (17)
and
CovH{ϕ
′[Π∗ +EG(Z˜|θ˜)],EF [max(K − P˜ , 0)|θ˜]} = 0, (18)
respectively. If the first-order expected background risk, EG(Z˜|θ), is preserved as θ varies,
i.e., EG(Z˜|θ) is a constant for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], it is evident that Eqs. (17) and (18) hold
simultaneously, thereby rendering the validity of the full-hedging theorem.
To show that Eqs. (15) and (16) need not hold simultaneously so that the firm optimally
uses options for hedging purposes, we focus on the case that the first-order expected price
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risk, EF (P˜ |θ), is preserved as θ varies, i.e., EF (P˜ |θ) is a constant for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Of course,
in this case the firm has to be risk averse to ensure that the futures contracts play a hedging
role. It is evident that the right-hand side of Eq. (13) vanishes so that a full-hedge, i.e.,
X = Q∗, is optimal should the firm use no options, i.e., Y = 0. It then follows from Eqs.
(9) and (14) and the second-order conditions for program (6) that Y ∗ > (<) 0 if, and only
if,
CovH
{
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ˜]}EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ˜],EF [max(K − P˜ , 0)|θ˜]
}
> (<) 0, (19)
where Π∗ = EF◦(P˜ )Q
∗−C(Q∗). The term, ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗+ Z˜)|θ]}u′(Π∗+ Z˜), is the marginal
ambiguity under a full-hedge and zero-option position. Using Eq. (4), condition (19) states
that this marginal ambiguity is second-order positively (negatively) dependent on the payoff
of the put option contracts, max(K − P˜ , 0). To further reduce the variability of its utility
under ambiguity, the firm is induced to opt for a long (short) put option position, thereby
invoking the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given that the ambiguity-averse competitive firm can hedge against the am-
biguous price risk, P˜ , by trading the fairly priced futures and put option contracts, and that
the first-order expected price risk, EF (P˜ |θ), is preserved as the parameter, θ, varies, the firm
optimally opts for a long (short) put option position, i.e., Y ∗ > (<) 0, if, and only if, the
marginal ambiguity, ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗+ Z˜)|θ]}u′(Π∗+ Z˜), is second-order positively (negatively)
dependent on the payoff of the put option contracts, max(K − P˜ , 0).
To show that condition (19) holds in non-trivial circumstances, we consider the case that
an increase in θ induces a mean-preserving-spread increase (decrease) in risk to the first-
order CDF, F (P |θ), and a mean-preserving-spread increase in risk to the first-order CDF,
G(Z|θ), in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Since max(K−P, 0) is convex in P , it
follows from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) that EF [max(K − P˜ , 0)|θ] increases (decreases)
with an increase in θ. Risk aversion implies that EG[u(Π
∗+Z˜)|θ] decreases with an increase
in θ. It then follows from ambiguity aversion that ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗ + Z˜)|θ]} increases with an
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increase in θ. If the firm’s utility function exhibits prudence, i.e., u′′′(Π) > 0, in the sense of
Kimball (1993), EG[u
′(Π∗ + Z˜)|θ] increases with an increase in θ. Hence, we conclude that
ϕ′{EG[u(Π
∗+Z˜)|θ]}EG[u
′(Π∗+Z˜)|θ] increases with an increase in θ given that u(Π) exhibits
both risk aversion and prudence. In this case, condition (19) holds so that Y ∗ > (<) 0. It is
worth mentioning that Y ∗ > (<) 0 even when the firm is ambiguity neutral, i.e., ϕ(U) = U .
One novel implication from Proposition 3 is in order. Suppose that there is no ambiguity,
i.e., the firm knows the objective CDFs, F ◦(P ) and G◦(Z). In this case, Eqs. (15) and
(16) hold trivially so that the full-hedging theorem applies in that X∗ = Q∗ and Y ∗ = 0.
Introducing ambiguity into the price and background risk by means of mean-preserving-
spreads induces the firm to optimally use options even when the firm is ambiguity neutral,
as is shown above. The hedging role of options arises because the ambiguous background
risk affects the firm’s marginal utility, making the latter second-order dependent on the
payoff of options. This is in stark contrast to the extant literature that focuses on a single
source of ambiguity, which shows that the behavior of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker
is unaffected by the introduction of, or changes in, ambiguity.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under
ambiguous price and background risk. The firm’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity
aversion developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Within the KMM model, ambiguity is
represented by a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty
about which of the subjective beliefs govern the price and background risk. On the other
hand, ambiguity preferences are modeled by the second-order expectation of a concave
transformation of the first-order expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible
subjective joint distribution of the price and background risk.
Within the KMM model, we show that the firm’s optimal production decision is inde-
pendent of the firm’s smooth ambiguity preferences and of the underlying ambiguous price
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and background risk, thereby invoking the separation theorem. We derive necessary and
sufficient conditions under which the full-hedging theorem holds. When these conditions do
not hold, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if ambiguity is
introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean-preserving-spreads. We as
such provide a rationale for the hedging role of options under smooth ambiguity preferences
and ambiguous price and background risk.
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